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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Defendant Leslie I o\a <"Appellant" or "Leslie") replies to the state's
brief as Jo] lows. Arguments not addressed in this reply briefwere either adequately
di sctissed in Appellant's opening brief or do not merit reply.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
.Appellant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the motel room which wais
reasonable under the circumstances. The state failed to establish that probable eause and
exigent circumstances justified the entry. The evidence seized from Appellant's motel
room after officers illegally entered it must be suppressed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. APPELLANT HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN HER MOTEL ROOM.
A. LESLIE HAD A SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.
A re\ iew of the facts demonstrates that Leslie had a subjective expectation of
privac\ in her motel room, Leslie was still in the room, packing her things, when the
ollicers arrived at 1:30 p.m. As fulls set forth in Appellant's opening brief, the totality
ol the manager's icstimon\ demonstrates thai the manager extended the checkout time to
allow I eslic to be out b\ 2:00 p.m. See c^ R. 91:16-17. While the state is correct that
the testimony technically shows that Leslie needed to be out hy 2:00 p.m.. the search and
seizure occurred in this case at 1:30 p.m.. well before the 2:00 p.m. deadline. Since the
manager's communication to i eslic as to the deadline by which she was required to
\acatc the room indicated that she had any time up until 2:00 p.m. to leave, the Fourth
Amendment violation occurred well before the deadline imposed by the manager. Eased
on the manager's extension of the deadline to allow Leslie to vacate the room at an\ time
up until 2:00 p.m.. Leslie had a continuing subjective expectation of privacy.
While the state is unwilling to acknowledge that the manager's repeated testimony
Without record support, the state arbitrarily selects 1:45 p.m. lor the time at
which the officers arrived at Leslie's room. State's brief at 12. The evidence shows and
the trial court found that the officers arrived at 1:30 p.m. R. 66; 91:25. There is no
evidence that the officers spent 15 minutes doing something other than approaching the
room when they arrived. Insiead. the evidence shows that either one of the officers
immediately went up to the room on his own (R. 91:25) or they both went straight to the
room and initially talked to the manager at the room (R. 91:17, 31). There is no evidence
that both officers talked to the manager at a place other than the room, let alone, that the
brief exchange with the manager lasted 15 minutes. Moreover, even if the officers
entered the room at 1:45 p.m.. Leslie nevertheless had a reasonable expectation of privacy
ince the officers entered her room prior to the 2:00 p.m. deadline for her to vacate thes
room
that she may have or did allow Leslie to vacate the room by 2:00 p.m. extended Leslie's
privac> interest in the room, it apparent!} is willing to extend the time to include a one-
hour grace period based on a passing reference by the manager. State's brief at 12. The
manager testified:
Manager: Well, actual!}. they're supposed to be out at 11:()() or pa\ hv
11:()(). She had come down to talk to me and 1may have extended that
time. We usualh give them a one-hour grace period, but / didsay that wc
close cit 2:00 that day and we most definitely had to he out he/ore then.
R. 91:13 (emphasis added). This testimony indicates that while in some circumstances
the manager gives a one-hour grace period, in this case. Leslie was told that she needed to
be out b} 2:00 p.m.
Ihe state also suggests that Leslie's expectation of privacy changed after the
manager visited the room at 1:()() p.m. and "told defendant [ ] to leave immediately and
was told in response [by Leslie's mother] that defendant would probably not even be out
b} 2:00 p.m. and then had the door slammed in her lace." Stale's brief at 12. citing
R. 91:15-16. Actually, the entirety of the exchange cited by the state establishes that
while the manager may have told Leslie that she needed to get out "immediately." she
also defined immediately as 2:00 p.m. R. 91:16. The manager did not change her
previous deadline of 2:00 p.m. when she went to the room at 1:00 p.m. In addition, the
slamming of the door by Leslie's mother evidences a belief that the room was still
Leslie's. The 1:()() p.m. visit by the manager and the outburst by Leslie's mother did
nothing to alter Leslie's belief that she had until 2:00 p.m. to vacate the room.
Ihe lact that Leslie had the motel room door open while moving also does not
change the fact that she had a subjective expectation of privacy of the room. Doors are
oiten open while people are moving because of the man} times people pass through the
door and to \ entilatc the room while people arc exerting themselves. lit addition, there is
no e\ idence as to how long the door had been opened or whether it had just been opened;
it ma\ well have just been opened to mo\e something out when the officers arrived. An
open door docs not mean that Leslie thought officers would come inside and rumniaize
through her belongings, and the open door in this ease did not put the officers in plain
view ofan\ of the contraband they later seized.
While the actual practice utilized in this ease was to extend Leslie's time so as to
require her to be out of the room b\ 2:00 p.m., Ms. I lathenbruck's testimony that her
usual practice is to work with people and extend the time bolsters the manager's
testimony that she extended the time in this case. The fact that extending the time was
consistent with the manager's usual practice and she ma}' have allowed Leslie to pav for
her room alter checkout time on a prior occasion, coupled with the testimony that she
extended the time in this case, establish that Leslie had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the room until 2:00 p.m.
The state relies on the factors set forth in State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65. 80 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) in arguing that Leslie did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the
room. State's brief at 9-14. Ihe Webb factors combine the two inquiries as to whether a
subjective expectation existed and whether that expectation was reasonable. Webb. 790
P.2d at 80.
As this court recently pointed out. there is no bright line test to use
in making this facl-sensitive determination [as to whether a legitimate
expectation of privacy exists], [citations omitted |. A legitimate expectation
of privacy incorporates two elements: first, whether the defendant
"exhibited an actual (subjective: expectation of privacy." and second,
whether that subjective expectation is "one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable." [citations omitted], factors relevant to this
inquiry include whether the defendant had am possessory or proprietary
interest in the place searched or the item seized in the challenged search:
was legitimately on the premises: had the right to exclude others from that
place; exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would remain free
from governmental invasion: or took normal precautions to maintain his
pri\ ac_\.
id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The use of the word "or" indicates that the listed
factors, while relevant to the inquiry, need not all be met in order to demonstrate a
subjective expectation of privacy. Moreover, any one factor, such as slamming the door
in the manager's face, thereby expressly exhibiting a subjective expectation of privacy.
might be enough to establish a subjective expectation ol"privacy.
Applying the Webb factors to this case further demonstrates that Leslie had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the room.
first, as outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 14-21. Leslie had a possessory
interest in the room up until 2:00 p.m.
Second, she was legitimately on the premises since even during the exchange at
1:()() p.m., the manager reiterated that I.eslic needed to be out bv 2:00 p.m. Packing
quickly indicated an attempt to cooperate, and did not indicate that Leslie did not think
she had a claim to the room at 1:30 p.m.
I bird. Leslie had a right to exclude others since her time had been extended.
A lack of objection as to the manager's presence does not indicate that Leslie did not have
an expectation of privacy; instead, it indicates that Leslie chose to be cooperative and trv
to vacale by 2:00 p.m.
fourth, the slamming of the door exhibited an expectation of privacy in the room.
Since there was no communication between Leslie and the manager after the door was
slammed, nothing changed in regard to Leslie's expectation. As set forth above, the open
door did not demonstrate a lack of expectation of privacy in the room. Moreover, the
mother's continued discussion would suggest that the mother at least believed that there
was a legitimate basis for continuing to exert control over the room and was an attempt to
maintain the privacy of the room even after the intimidation that can be caused bv the
arrival of police officers.
'flic state reiies on Com, v. Brass, 674 N.E.2d 1326 (Mass. App. Ct.). cert, denied,
679 N.I,.2d 558 (Mass. 1997). in support of its argument that Leslie did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the room since checkout time was 1!:()() a.m. See
state's briefat 9. In Brass, unlike the present case, the defendant made no attempt to
extend the time for checkout and had not received permission from the manager to stay
beyond checkout time. Brass. 674 N.E.2d at 1327. Instead, "well beyond checkout
time." the manager went to the room "from which the defendant and a companion were
supposed to have checked out earlier but had not." kk Applying a general rule "that a
person who stay s over in a hotel or motel room "after his rental period has terminated" has
lost any reasonable expectation of privacy in the room that he may have once had" under
the circumstances in Brass (LL at 1327-28) is significantly different from taking such an
approach in this case where the manager allowed Leslie to slay in the room until the
manager had to leave at 2:00 p.m. In this case, Leslie had a subjective expectation of
privacy in the room which was reasonable.
B. LESLIE'S EXPECTATION OL PRIVACY IN THE'. ROOM WAS
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE;.
I he application of the Webb factors outlined above likewise demonstrates that
I eslie's expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable since those factors relate to
both aspects of the inquiry.
In addition, as the state acknowledges at page 15 of its brief, the evidence showed
that Leslie may hav e been allowed to pay for her room after check-out time in the past;
this past experience would certainly create a reasonable expectation on Leslie's part that
the manager was extremely Hexible as to when she must actually leave. The manager did
not clearly indicate to Leslie that she was a holdover tenant; instead, although the
manager referred to the 1 1:()() a.m. checkout, the cist of the communication from the
manager to Leslie was that ; .eslic was to be out by 2:00 p.m. if she did not pav for
another day, It was objectively reasonable to have an expectation of privacy in the room
until thai lime.
The state's reliance en United States v. Allen. 106 E.3d 695. 699 (6,h Cir. 1997).
United States v. Singleton. l>22 1. Snpp. 1322 (1). Kansas 1996). and State v. Perkins.
588 N.W.2d 491. 492-93 (Minn. 1999). is misplaced. In Allen, the clerk told the tenant
that he needed to pay additional money in order to keep the room. Allen. 106 L.3d at 697.
I he tenant said he would pay that shorth . Li. An hour later, when the tenant had not
paid the amount, the clerk called the room and did not receive an answer. EL The clerk
told the manager, who went to the room. 1he manager unlocked the door, went inside
and fotmd marijuana. The manager left and locked the room with a lockout bolt that onlv
she could open. LL In concluding that Allen did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the room, the court relied on the fact that the manager had taken possession of
the room bv locking the defendant out. thereby divesting him of his occupancy of the
room and privacy interest in its contents, hi at 699. In this case, the manager look no
such action to divest Leslie of the occupancy of the room. Instead, the manager reiterated
that Leslie must be out of the room by 2:00 p.m.
Perkins. 588 N.\V.2d at 491. likewise does not support the state's argument. In
Perkins, the defendant signed a registration card which indicated that guests who created
a disturbance would be asketl to leave, kk at 493. Perkins had been warned twice that his
party was too loud, "and could not have been unaware that the "party' remained
exeessiv ely loud." UL The court held that under these circumstances. Perkins was
divested of any privacy interest in the room, kk By contrast, in the present ease. Leslie
had not been warned that her occupancy would be terminated because of her mother's
bchav ior. and the mother's behavior did not rise to the level of the behavior in Perkins.
Singleton also did not involve a situation like the present one where the manager
had agreed to extend the time for departure. In Singleton, the tenant told the manager that
he wanted to stay an additional night, and that he would come to the office risht awav and
pay. Singleton. 922 L. Supp. at 1525. At around 1:00 p.m.. two hours after checkout
time, the manager phoned the room three times, asking when the tenant would be arriviim
with the rent money, kk The tenant told the manager that he was waiting for an
employ ment check, kk The manager told the tenant that he would be charged for an
additional halfdav if he staved past 2:00 p.m.. then called again at 2:00 p.m.. looking for
the rent, kk "Anticipating a problem because [the tenant] now owed the Inn rent for one-
half da}, [the managerj called [the police] around 3:00 p.m." kk Unlike the present ease
where Ms. Ilathenbruck extended the deadline for departure until 2:00 p.m.. the manager
in Singleton made it clear that the defendant was required to leave at checkout time.
The state argues further that Leslie did not have a privacy interest in the room
because the interests of society outweigh Leslie's fourth Amendment interests and
require that the officers be able to search under these circumstances. State's brief at
I7-l 8. Contrary to the state's claim, officers did not need to circumvent the fourth
Amendment in order to resolve this situation. They could have simplv asked Leslie to
step outside the room and talked to her about the situation. If the mother continued to
interrupt or make noise, the officers could have asked her to quiet down without entering
the room, or asked Leslie to control her mother. Leslie was trying to vacate the room bv
2:01) p.m. As the officer recognized, there was no urgency or exigency requiring entrv.
R. 9 1:32. A serious crime w as not involved and it was not a violent situation. Instead,
there were simply two people under the pressure of a deadline who were trying to move
out. Ihis hard!} warrants a determination that society"s interests outweigh the protections
provided by the fourth Amendment. See Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740. 750 (1980)
("When the gov ernment's interest is only to arrest for a minor (dfense, that prestimption
ol unreasonableness [which attaches to warrantless home entries | is difficult to
rebut . . . >,
I Inder these circumstances where the manager led Leslie to believe that she could
remain in the room as long as she was out by 2:00 p.m.. Leslie had subjective expectation
ol privacy in the room which was objectively reasonable.
POINT IE flii-: STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT PROBABLE
CAUSE AND E.XKiENTCIRCUMS'IANCE'.SJUSddflE.DTHI-;
SEARCH.
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (1999). the state suggests that the officers
had probable cause to enter Leslie's motel room because the door was open and Leslie's
mother was engaging in the crime of disorderly conduct. State's brief at 19-21. Utah
Code Ann. s "6-9-1 02 ( 1999) states:
76-9-102. Disorderly Conduct
t 1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to
move from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or
physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no legitimate
purpose: or
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(i) engages in lighting or in violent, tumultuous, or
threatening behav ior:
(ii) makes unreasonable noise in a public place;
(iiil makes unreasonable noises in a private place
which can be heard in a public place: or
i iv i obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
(2 ) "Public place." for the purpose of this section, means any place to
which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes
but is not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of schools.
hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(3 I Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense
continues after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise, it is an
infraction.
\ 'tali Code Ann. ij 76-9-102 (1999). Without analyzing how this statute applies to the
facts of this case, the state simply assumes that the facts in this case created probable
cause to arrest on disorderly conduct because "defendant's mother again began a
disturbance, apparently yelling both at the police and the manager. R. 91:37-38." State's
brief at 20-21.
The record fails to demonstrate probable cause to arrest Leslie's mother for
disorderly conduct. The portion of the record cited by the state indicates that Leslie's
mother was interrupting the oflicers* conversation with the manager "and veiling, causing
our conversation to be interrupted, so the other officer entered the room and brought her
to the far side of the room and explained to her that she would have her turn to talk to me
and that she just needed to keep quiet until I finished with Margie." R. 91:37-38. There
is no evidence suggesting that Leslie's mother refused to comply with a lawful order to
move from a public place or knowingly created a hazardous or physically offensive
condition as required by subsection (a). Nor is there evidence Leslie's mother intended to
cause "public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm" or recklessly created a risk thereof, or
that she made unreasonable noise in a public place, or unreasonable noises in a private
place which could be heard in public. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 <b) (1999). The
evidence shows only that Leslie's mother interrupted the oflicers and veiled. This is not
enough to establish probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct, as evidenced by the
officer's testimony that exigent circumstances were not involved, and the fact that the
record does not indicate that Leslie's mother was arrested.
Ihe state also seems to suggest that entry was reasonable because the manager had
consented to the entry. State's brief at 20, citing infer alia Illinois v. Rodriguez. 497 U.S.
177. 185-86 ( 1990). While the record demonstrates that the manager told the officers she-
was trying to get Leslie and her mother out of the room, it does not indicate thai the
manager gave the officers pe-mission to enter the room. See R. 9] :27. 31. 37. In
addition, one of the officers was already in the room while the other officer was talking to
the manager and receiving information about the situation. R. 91:37-38. Since neither
officer had talked to the manager when the first officer entered the room, the officer who
entered the room could not have received consent from the manager. Moreover, a belief
that the manager could consent would not be reasonable since, as the officer
acknowledged. "[t|here were some arrangements made between the manager and
Ms. I.o}a prior to my arrival, as far as exact times. I don't recall-." R. 91:33. Since the
officer was informed that arrangements had been made to extend the time, even if the
manager had given them permission to enter, it would not have been reasonable for
officers to assume the manager could consent in light of this information and the mother's
insistent interruptions.
The record also does not demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying a
warrantless entry. The state argues that the prior conduct of Leslie's mother as reported
by the manager coupled with the mother's actions in interrupting the officers and yelling
when the_v were talking to the manager established exigent circumstances. State's brief
at 21. According to the state. "[u]nder such circumstances, a reasonable person would
have believed that immediate entry was necessary to defuse the mother's anger before the
situation escalated to violence and to ensure that the disagreement between the mother
and the manager could be settled peacefully." State's brief at 21 (emphasis added), first,
although the mother was apparently upset, it was not reasonable to assume that the
situation would escalate into violence. While the mother slammed the door prior to the
13
arrival of oflicers. she did not threaten or harm the manager. Once the officers asserted
their presence, an}' harm was even less likely. Expressing one's anger is not synonymous
with creating probable cause to believe that an individual will become violent.
Second, exigent circumstances by definition include circumstances where it was
reasonable to believe that entry "'was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers
or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some
other consequence improperlv' frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts."' State v.
Voder. 935 P.2d 534. 540 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (further citation omitted). Keeping a
situation from escalating is not necessarily an exigent circumstance; instead, it must be
reasonable under the circumstances to believe entry was necessary to prevent physical
harm. In this ease, the evidence does not demonstrate that it was reasonable to think the
mother would harm Ms. Hathenbruck. Ms. Hathenbruek was not in the motel room.
Although the mother had yelled and slammed a door earlier, she had not threatened
Ms. Hathenbruck or done anything to suggest she would harm the manager during the
prior interactions. Alter the officers arrived, any possibility of violence was even less
likely. The officers merely wanted the mother to quiet down while they talked to the
manager. Moreover, the officers themselves did not think that any urgency existed, as
evidenced by the officer's acknowledgment that exigent circumstances did not exist.2
2 When the police officer testified that no exigent circumstances existed which
required entry (R. 91:32), the trial judge interrupted and stated that while he would
entertain the officer's opinion that no exigency existed, the ultimate determination as to
14
Third, even if the officers had probable cause to arrest the mother for disorderly
conduct, the state's interest in arresting on such a minor offense does not overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness which attaches to a warrantless entry of a home or
motel room. See Welsh. 466 C.S. at 750. In Welsh, the Supreme Court held that the
warrantless entry into defendant's home and arrest for drunk driving violated the fourth
Amendment. The Court reasoned that since drunk driving in Wisconsin was a
""noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment [was] possible.'"
society's interests in arresting the defendant did not outweigh the interests protected bv
the fourth Amendment. City of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384. 1389 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (quoting Welsh. 466 I ES. at 750).
In Henrie. this Court concluded that the warrantless entry into the defendant's
home and arrest for drunk driving and leaving the scene of an accident did not violate the
fourth Amendment due to the greater penalties attached to drunk driving in Utah, and the
existence of probable cause to believe the defendant had committed an additional crime.
Henrie. 868 P.2d at 1389. Because the offense was serious in nature and evidence could
be lost as the defendant's blood alcohol level dissipated, this Court concluded that the
officers in Henrie did not violate the fourth Amendment when they entered the
defendant's home to effectuate an arrest.
whether exigent circumstances existed was a question of law which he would decide.
While the legal conclusion is one for a court to make, the officer's testimony nevertheless
demonstrates that there was no urgency in this situation.
The offense which the state claims justified the entry in this case is minor if it
existed at all. There is not evidence that the behavior continued after the officers made a
request to desist. The offense was therefore an infraction, which is not punishable by
imprisonment. See Utah Code Ann. $ 76-9-102 (3) (1999). Even if the officers had
asked Leslie's mother to desist and she persisted, the offense would have been punishable
only as a class C misdemeanor. The behavior of Leslie's mother was not nearly as
serious as the drunk driving and hit and run which occurred in Henrie. Instead, it is more
on par. and even less serious than the offense in Welsh. Pursuant to Welsh, the officers
did not have exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entrv.
A review of the record demonstrates that the state failed to sustain its burden of
establishing that probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry
of the motel room. Remand for findings on this issue is unnecessary since the record
establishes that the entry was notjustilled under this alternative ground which the state
urges for affirmance on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed reversible error in denying Appellant's motion to
suppress the evidence seized, from her motel room. Appellant respectfully requests that
this Court overturn her conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent the illegally
seized evidence.
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